The Development of Property Rights in Land: A Comparative Study by Feeny, David
Yale University 
EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale 
Discussion Papers Economic Growth Center 
6-1-1984 
The Development of Property Rights in Land: A Comparative 
Study 
David Feeny 
Follow this and additional works at: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/egcenter-discussion-paper-series 
Recommended Citation 
Feeny, David, "The Development of Property Rights in Land: A Comparative Study" (1984). Discussion 
Papers. 467. 
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/egcenter-discussion-paper-series/467 
This Discussion Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Economic Growth Center at EliScholar – A 
Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. It has been accepted for inclusion in Discussion Papers by an 
authorized administrator of EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. For more information, 





P.O. Box 1987, Yale Station 
27 Bill rome Avenue 
New Haven, Q>nnectiait 06520 
CENl'ER DifDJSS!Clt PAPER Rl. 459 
'1BE JlEVEIJJHmm' CP PklPERlY RIGHl'S IN INI>: 
A CXJIPARATIVE SlU>Y 
David Feeny 
June, 1984 
!btes: David Feeny is a Visiting Scholar at the Ea>ncmdc Growth 
Center, on Sabbatical leave from ~ter thiversity, 
Omada. 
Center Disaission Papers are pre11 ■1Mty llllt:erial.s circulated 
to stiJllll.ate disalssion and critical oc: nt. References in 
pJblications to Discussion Pape~s amul.d be cleared with the 
author to protect the tentative chlract:er of tbese papers. 
ABSTRACT 
*THE DEVELOPMENT OF PROPERTY RIGHTS IN LAND: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 
In order to examine the trends in the development of property 
rights in land in nineteenth and twentieth century Asia, a simple supply 
and demand model of induced institutional change is presented. over much 
of the period favorable terms of trade for land-intensive agricultural 
products caused real land rents to appreciate. This induced an increase 
in the demand for more secure and precise property rights in land. The 
particular type of institutional arrangements supplied depended upon the 
existing set of institutions and property rights, the stock of knowledge, 
and the political, economic and ideological interests of the governments 
in power. The model is applied to four Asian countries, Thailand, Burma, 
India, the Philippines, and the experiences are compared. In all four 
cases cadastral survey-based land titling systems were introduced. 
Finally, implications for future research are discussed. 
•This paper sketches sooie arguments about the development of property
rights systems in Asia and presents sane suggestive evidence. Can­
■ entary on both the analytical approach and incomplete empirical content 
are more than welcome. Previous versions of ·the J>aper have been 
presented at the 35th Annual Meeting of the Association for Asian 
Studies, March 25, 1983, the Council on Southeast Asian Studies, Yale 
University, the Economic Growth Center, Yale University, the Center for 
the Canparative Study of Development, Brown University, and the 
economics department, Northeastern University. The author has benefited 
fran the comr.ients of the participants at those presentations. In ad~ 
dition helpful suggestions were made by Richard Barichello Fred 
Carstensen, Victor Doherty, iobert Evenson, Yujiro llayami, 'Samuel 
Popkin, Carl Pray, Louis Putterman, and James C. Scott. 
Over the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the economies of 
South and Southeast Asia became increasingly commercialized and 
participated in the worldwide growth in international COIIUllerce. Ac­
companying trends included an elaboration of the system of property 
rights in land and gradual dismantling of property rights .in man (debt 
slavery and corvee). Fundamental changes in the system of taxation were 
also evident. 
The paper represents a first attempt as part of a larger 
on-going project to explain the trends in the systems of property rights 
with a particular focus on property rights in land. In the process a 
simple model of induced institutional change is elaborated and tested 
against experience in South and Southeast Asia. A by-product of the 
effort is an increased understanding of Asian economic history in the 
period. An advantage of the comparative approach arises because while 
each of the economies experienced a similar set of trends in relative 
prices as integration into the world economy became more complete, tht.-:-e 
was also a substantial amount of diversity among the countries both in 
terms of their indigenous systems of property rights and the property 
rights policies of the colonial powers (for those countries which were 
directly colonized). 
In the first section a model of induced institutional change 
is presented. Trends in relative product and factor prices are discus­
sed in Section II. Case studies including Thailand, Buma, India, and 
the Philippines are taken up in Section III. Conclusions are dra~~ in 
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Section rv. Finally, implications for future research are sketched in 
Section V. 
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Sec lion I: A Supply and Demand Model of Induced Inslilutional Change: 
Property Rights in Land 
Just as the demand for technical change responds to trends in 
relative factor prices, it is argued in the induced institutional chang~ 
approach, that the demand for institutional change responds in a sirnila:::-
fashion. The approach is described within the supply and demand 
paradigm as a means of organizing the analysis. 
The demand for institutional change arises when some gain 
1cannot be captured under current institutional arrangements. Changes in 
relative factor or product prices, changes in the size of markets, 
changes in technology, and changes in the basic decision rules of 
gover11I'.lent are among the important exogenous influences that create lhe 
disequilibria in which current institutional arrangements fail lo allo~ 
for the full capture of gains. The common sources of the potential 
benefits for changing institutions have included the achievement of 
economies of scale, reduction of risk or transaction cost, or the 
amelioration of externalities, incomplete markets, and market failure. 
All of these factors affect the demand for institutional change. 
In the specific case of the syster:i of property rights, an 
appreciation in the relative price of a factor will induce an increase 
in the demand for an institution to define property rights in thal 
factor and induce an increase in the benefits derived from the 
utilization of that system of property rights. Thus an appreciation of 
the relative price of a factor will increase the demand for establishing 
a system of property rights in that factor and increase the use of that 
4 
system. 
The analysis of the demand for institutional change concer.ns 
situations in which there are potential benefits to some party that are 
only attainable through the creation of a new set of institutional 
arrangements. The factors that affect the demand for change are then 
the factors that serve to create the potential benefits for the users of 
institutional arrangements. Whether change will indeed occur depends, 
however, on the supply of institutional change -- the willingness anJ 
capability of the fundamental institutions of government to provide new 
2a-::-rangernents. The capability depends in part on the cost of 
institutional innovation. As in the technical change case, the cost 
depends in part upon the stock of existing kno~ledge on the desi£n and 
operation of institutions. The knowledge stock in turn depends upon 
past experience in production, trade, and distribution as well as the 
previously existing set of institutions and the nature and degree of 
research on institutions. Just as investments in basic science research 
can affect the supply of technical change, investments in educational 
institutions and research (especially in legal studies and the social 
sciences) can effect the supply of institutional change through both the 
creation and borrowing of new ideas in institutional design. In ad-
dition to the effects of the stock of knowledge, the cost of supplying 
new institutions depends upon the factor prices of the factors used in 
institutional design. Implementation costs will also affect the supply. 
The willingness to provide new arrangements does not solely 
depend on the cost; it also importantly depends on the private benefits 
and costs of providing the change to the agents who are in a position to 
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provide change, the elite decision makers of government. The 
fundamental institutions of a society and the initial distribution of 
power will thus have a significant impact on the kinds of new 
institutional arrangements which are supplied. In some thecases 
elite's incentives will be consistent with actions that serve to 
maximize social welfare; in other cases their incentives may not be 
compatible. 
The provision of new institutional arrangements has a public 
good characteristic. In addition to being affected by the demand for 
change (arising out of the self-interest of subjects) and supply of 
chan~e (in part reflecting the self-interests of the elite), it is also 
3affected by ideology and conventional wisdom. Notions of how the world 
should and how it does operate affect institutional design. North 
argues that ideology is used by the state to ameliorate the free-rider 
problem, to reduce the incentives to act only on the basis of narrow 
self-interest. Ideology thus facilitates the organization of collective 
action. In the colonial property rights development setting, different 
colonial powers had different ideologies concerning the organization of 
property rights and those ideologies and the conventional wisdoms that 
accompanied them changed over time. 
Institutional change then arises through the interaction of 
the demand for and supply of change in dynamic sequences. The 
institutional response in one period becomes part of the initial 
conditions in the next period thus affecting the subsequent path of 
change. In the property rights case there was often a gradual evolution 
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of arrangements from simple changes to increasingly elaborate and 
complicated systems. The approach is summarized in Table 1. 
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Table l: Supply and Demand Model of Induced Institutional Change:
Property Rights in Land 
Endogenous Variables 
Institutional Arrangements: legal provisions defining property 
rights in land and in particular the 
degree of security of land rights 
Utilization of the existing institutional arrangements: 
the degree to which cultivators or 
owners made use of the system 
Exogenous Variables 
Demand for Institutional Change 
Relative Product and Factor Prices 
Basic Rules of Government 
Technology 
Size of Market 
Sources of Gains from Innovation 
Capital gains 
Amelioration of Incomplete Markets 1 Externalities 1 Market Failure, 
and Common Property Resource Problems 
Risk Sharing 
Achievement of Economies of Scale 
Reductions of Transaction Cost 
Supply of Institutional Change 
Cost of Innovation 





Private Returns to Elite Decision Makers 
Interaction of Demand and Supply: Dynamic Sequences 
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Section II: Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Asian Trends in kelative 
Product and Factor Prices 
In the supply and demand model of institutional change brieflv 
sketched in Section I, attention is focused on the important role of 
trends in relative factor prices in detennining the deraand for Lhe 
establislment of more elaborate systems of property rights. Thus in 
order to apply the model, an examination of those trends is needed. 
In an effort to provide some preliminary documentation on 
these trends both direct and indirect evidence will be utilized. The 
indirect evidence comes from the trends in the tenns of trade, the ratio 
of the export price of land-intensive agricultural products to the 
impor.t price of manufactured goods. The terms of trade measure the 
incentives afforded to an econooy by the opportunity of engaging in 
international trade. The trends in the terms of trade reflect the 
division of the gains from trade among the two trading partners. The 
gains from trade are the increases in real income made possible by 
trading. 
In a closed economy (no interenational trade), real land rents 
(the charge for the use of the services of land in production) are 
sensitive to population density. As population density rises there is a 
tendency for real land rents to appreciate with respect to real wages. 
At low population densities real wages tend to be high realtive to real 
land rents. This close association between real land renLs and 
population density is, however, broken when the economy engages in large 
scale international trade. Now relative produce prices are determined 
on world markets rather than within the econooiy itself. Real land rents 
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are now linked to the endowments of land, labor, and capital, production 
technology, and the external tenns of trade. Thus it is possible to use 
a simple general equilibrium model with two goods (agricultural and 
aanufactured) and three factors of production (land specific to 
agriculture, mobile capital and labor), to predict the trends in 
relative factor prices. 4 While the results for the trends in real wages 
are somewhat ambiguous and depend on the parameter values of the factor 
shares, employment shares, and elasticities of substitution, the results 
for the trend in real land rents are much more clearcut. Real land 
rents are very sensitive to the trend in the tenns of trade (a result of 
assuming that land is specific to agriculture). This follows because as 
the relative price of the agricultural product rises, resources move 
fran the other sector (manufacturing) into agriculture. Labor and 
capital are, however, imperfect substitutes for land. Thus as people 
seek to expand agricultural output in response to the favorable prices, 
land rents are bid up. Thus we can use the trend in the terms of trade 
as a proxy for the trend in real land rents. 
Data on the terms of trade are presented in Table 2. The data 
on the Thai terms of trade have the advantage of directly reflecting the 
ratio of the price of the argicultural to the manufactured product and 
cover a long time period~ The data indicate a relative appreciation of 
agricultural prices from the 1860s to 1912, decline over the 1912 to 
1925 period, and finally appreciation from the mid-I 920s to the end of 
the 1930s. Overall, the relative price of the agricultural product 
appreciated over the whole period. 
10 
Table 2: Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Trends in the Tenns of Trade ........................................................................ 
















Export price of rice 
divided by import 
price of white or grey 
shirting, respectively; 
Feeny (1982, pp. 17 and 
131). 
1865-67 to 1939 0.47 or 0.85 
1865-67 to 1940 1.52 or 1.95 
Burma: 
1870-71 to 1912-13 1.90 External terms of 
a1890-92 to 1912-13 1.62 trade, or Int6rnal 1912-13 to 1925-26 -1.33 or -1.44 terms of trade; Aye
1925-26 to 1939-40 -0.41 or 0.82 Hlaing (1964, pp. 145-
148). 
1870-71 to 1939-40 0.81 
1890-92 to 1939-40 0.55 
India: 
1861-69 to 1906-14 0.90 Net barter terms of 
1906-14 to 1931-39 -0.79 trade, index of export 
prices divided by
1861-69 to 1931-39 0.29 index of import 
prices; Bhatia (1969, 
PP• 417-419). 
1903-08 to 1934-39 -0.14 or -0.51 Laspeyres and Paasche 
indices of terms of 
trade respectively; 
Appleyard (1969, P• 
190). 
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Table 2 continued: 
1888 to 1914 1.12 Paasche index of terms
1914 to 1936 0.08 of trade; Birnberg and
Resnick (1975, p. 285). 
1888 to 1936 0.65 
Philippines: 
1902 to 1925 0.51 Paasche index of terms
1925 to 1938 -2.86 of trade; Birnberg and
1902 to 1938 -0.77 Resnick (1975, p. 306).
........................................................................ 
8 Index of export prices divided by index of import prices. 
b 
Index of domestic paddy price divided by index of the unit value of
consumer goods imports. 
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On the basis of the trends reflected in these terms of trade 
indices, one would expect that in periods during which the tenns of 
trade were improving, real land rents would have been appreciating and 
that the overall trend in real land rents would have been one of ap-
preciation. Evidence confirming the predictions will be discussed 
below. 
Much the same trends in the terms of trade evident for 
Thailand are also apparent for Burma (see Table 2). From the 1870s to 
1912 the ratio of the price of rice or paddy to the prices of imp.orted 
goods rose. Fran 1912 to 1925 the terms of trade declined and then rose 
for one series and fell for the other over the 1925 to 1940 period. 
Again, overall the terms of trade appreciated. 
Data on the Indian terms of trade presented by Bhatia and by 
Appleyard and Birnberg and Resnick for the later period, give much the 
same impression as the Thai and Burmese indices: an appreciation from 
the 1860s to 1910s and decline in the interwar period (see Table 2). 
These terms of trade indices for India are not ideal in that 
manufactured goods were both exported and imported, as were agricultural 
products. Still the bulk of the exports are land-intensive goods 
relative to the import bundle. Hore disaggregated indices would be 
·desirable. 
Finally, Birnberg and Resnick present evidence on the terms of 
trade for the Philippines (see Table 2). There appears to have been an 
appreciation over the 1902 through 1925 period, sharp decline from 1925 
through 1938, and decline for the overall period. 
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The sample of trends in the tenns of trade presented in Table 
2 points to an appreciation over the period from the mid-nineteenth 
century until World War I. Therefore one would expect that over the 
period there would have been increased production and specialization in 
export activities and an appreciation in real land rents. Each of the 
predictions will be examined. 
Data on the trends in rice exports and cotton goods imports 
for Thailand and Burma are presented in Table 3. Indeed rice exports 
appear to have increased, especially in periods during which the terms 
of trade were increasingly favorable. Similarly there was a rapid 
expansion of cotton goods imports (the leading import in each of the 
countries). While rice export data are only an indirect indicator of 
paddy production trends, there is evidence that production responded to 
the price incentives reflected in the terms of trade. The conclusion is 
corroborated by the accounts and measures (largely for the twentieth 
century period) of the rapid increases in the area under paddy 
cultivation in both Burma and Thailand. 5 
Thus it appears that production trends followed the terms of 
trade. But that happened to real land rents, measured in rice or 
manufactured goods? In Table 4 several crude measures of real land rent 
trends are presented. The use of the price of land rather than actual 
rent assumes that the trend in land rents is reflected in the trend in 
land prices. 6 While data on actual land rents would be preferable, long 
time series on rents are generally not available. For purposes of 
fleshing out the broad trends, however, the real land price series 
should be more than adequate. 
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Table 3: Growth of Agricultural Exports and Manufactured Goods Imports ......................................................................... 
Value of 
Quantity Value of cotton 
of rice rice goods 




















1864 to 1940 2.84 3.41 3. 16 




1870-75 to 1905-10 
1876-80 to 1911-15 
1905-10 to 1920-25 
1911-15 to 1921-25 
1920-25 to 1935-40 










Aye Hlaing (1964, 









The results presented in Table 4 confonn to our predictions. 
When the terms of trade appreciated, real land prices appreciated, when 
the terms of trade declined, so did real land rents. Thus it appears to 
be reasonable to use the terms of trade as a proxy for the trend in real 
land rents when direct evidence is unavailable. This conclusion is 
further corroborated by the widespread reports of an appreciation of 
land prices over the mid-nineteenth to early twentieth century period. 
----------------------------------------------------------------------
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Table 4: Rate of Change in Real Land Prices in Percent per Year...............................•..........................•................ 
Land Price Land Price 
Deflated by Deflated by 
Price of Price of 
Rice Manufactured 










-1 .09 or -0.14 
4.17 or 4.55 
Deflated by price of 
white or grey shirting 
1915 to 1940 1.41 2.03 or 2.65 
respectively; Feeny 
(1982, PP• 20 and 33) 
Bunna: 
1889-90 to 1920-21 3.25 2.52 Deflated by domestic 
paddy price; deflated by 
unit value of consumer 
goods imports; Aye Hlaing 
(1964, pp. 128 and 147-48) 
............... •'• .......................................................... 
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Section III: Case Studies 
Given the generally favorable terms of trade movements over 
the last half of the nineteenth century and given the concomitant ap­
preciation in real land rents and the expansion of the production of 
land-intensive agricultural products, the simple supply and demand model 
of institutional change predicts that. there would be an increase in the 
demand for more elaborate and secure systems of property rights in land 
and a great.er utilization of the institutional arrangements of that 
system. The evidence on the trends in the demand for property rights in 
land and the responses of the central authorities to those demands will 
now be examined. In the process a number of rather sweeping 
generalizations will be made, tending to blur the diversity of 
experience among regions and over time within each country. It should 
be understood that. as the modern transportation system spread, the 
relative price of agricultural products rose in previously less com­
mercialized areas and the whole process was repeated. 
The strategy here is to describe the "traditional" indigenous 
system of property rights in land that existed in the early nineteenth 
century period and then to trace the major changes that occurred over 
time. The trends in Thailand, Burma, India, and the Philippines will be 
briefly sketched. 
Thailand 
The early nineteenth century system of property rights in land 
in Thailand was essentially one of usufruct rights. Al long as the 
cultivator continued to use the land he (or she) had the right to 
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exclude others from using it, sell it, pass it on to his heirs, or u·se 
it as collateral to obtain a loan. The maintenance of the rights 
depended on the payment of land taxes. If the land was abandoned for 
more than three consecutive years, rights were forfeited. 
Over the first half of the nineteenth century there was a 
gradual increase in the degree of commercialization of the Thai econony 
7and increasing ties to regional and world markets. During the fourth 
reign (1851-1868) land rights were made more fonnal through the issuance 
of title deeds based on paddy land tax receipts. In 1867-68 titles for 
paddy land for which the tax was based on the area harvested were 
introduced. In 1882-1883 for some major Central Plain rice producing 
provinces titles based on the area owned rather than harvested were 
issued for. the first time. The titles could be obtained by presenting 
to officials the tax receipts for the previous ten years. Documents 
were also available to give cultivators of newly cleared areas the 
rights to exclude others while developing the land for three years at 
which time rights were forfeited if the area had not been developed. 
The appreciation of land prices continued and deficiencies in 
the property rights system became apparent. Frequent land disputes 
occurred (the expected gain from obtaining ownership rose and justified 
the transaction cost of disputation). During the 1880s the governr.ient 
responded by issuing standard fonns and prescribing standardized 
procedures. The lack of a central place for land records meant, 
however, that more than one set of titles could be issued for the same 
piece of land and disputes became increasingly frequent. 
The response was the passage of a more comprehensive land law 
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in 1892. It created nine types of land, including land held by 
religious institutions, royal land, residential land, agricultural land, 
land used for mining, forest and jungle land, and waterway land. The 
agricultural land category included three types of orchards and gardens, 
upland land, two types of paddy land, and garden lands. Provisions were 
made for transferable title deeds which could be used as collateral and 
there were documents and procedures for the registration of such 
transactions. Homesteading provisions were included as well as 
procedures for converting old documents to the newly created ones. The 
1892 land law replaced the earlier rather ad hoc system with a more 
comprehensive one. 
However, major deficiencies in the legislation and its 
administration remained. The lack of central land title offices and 
precise descriptions of the boundaries of the land in question meant 
that disputes over ownership could not be easily resolved and land could 
not be unambiguously identified. These problems became very conspicious 
in the Rangsit area (to the northeast of Bangkok, a major commercial 
rice-exporting region in the Central Plain) during the boom of the 1890s 
when a number of very bitter land disputes arose. As a result the Royal 
Survey Department was diverted 'from its work on mapping and in ·1896 
began cadastral surveys, initially concentrating on the Rangsit area but 
later expanding into ~ost of the major rice-exporting areas in the 
Central Plain. 
In 1901 the Torrens system of land titling with central 
provincial land record offices and cadastral surveys was formally 
adopted. From 1901 to 1909 eleven land record offices were established. 
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By 1909-10 593,069 title deeds had been issued in the Central Plain 
(637,001 for the whole kinedom) and the area surveyed was 1,605, OU(J lia 
(1,671,000 ha for the whole kingdom). The work was carried out by 
European experts (mainly on loan from the Indian Civil Service) who in 
addition to conducting the survey work also provided training to th~ 
Thai staff. After 1909 the Royal Survey Department was transferred back 
to its original mapping duties and the rate of increase in the surveyed 
area plunged. The nunber of title deeds on file (primarily in the 
Central Plain) did, however, continue to increase; the rate of increase 
of title deeds on file for the whole kingdon was 4.69 percent per yea-:-: 
over the 1905-06 to 1941 period. 
The syster.1 was incompletely realized. A lack of diligent 
record keeping and administration reduced the benefits. Not all farmers 
obtained or were able to obtain the proper documents for land which they 
held. Areas outside the Central Plain were especially incompletely 
served by cadastral surveys. 
After 1909 there were a nunber of minor changes to the syster.1 
implemented during the pre-World War II period. Administrative 
procedures were changed and fees were instituted on land transfers. 
Restrictions were placed on the sale of public lands in 1916 and 1919 
with the intent of curbing land speculation. Finally, in 1938-39 a ne\o/ 
schedule of agricultural land taxes was established. 
A more major change was made in 1936 when the 1901 la\o/ was 
amended to allow for the registration of claims on unsurveyed lands. 
While traditionally claims on apparently unclaimed lands were registered 
with the village headman, the 1936 law required registration at the Land 
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Department. The 1936 law represented a compromise between the elaborate 
European cadastral survey system of the 1901 law and the incomplcLt.: 
implementation of that system. The compromise was extended in 1954 when 
a new comprehensive land law was enacted. It provides for a variety of 
land documents that give different levels of security of land rights. 
Occupation certificates are issued by village headman and canr,1une 
leaders and allow the holder to temporarily exclude others froo usin;; 
land as long as it is being developed. Reserve licences issued by 
district officers also give rights for temporary occupation subject to 
utilization. Exploitation testimonials (again issued by district of-
ficers) confirm that utilization of previously reserved land has taken 
place and confer rights that are transferable and inheritable. Finally 
full title deeds issued by cadastral survey and providing ·for the 
recording of land transactions are issued by officials in the provincial 
capital. The 1954 code is the basis of the current systen of land 
rights in Thailand~ Tl,e major changes in the Thai property rights 
system are sunmarized in Table 5. 
Even within the parameters of the compromise embodied in the 
1954 code, the system is still incomplete. Ingram reports estimates for 
the late 1960s of the area covered by three types of land docunents. 
Only 12 percent of the total area had full title deeds, 4 percent had 
reserve licenses, 18 percent had exploitation testimonials, anc 65 
8percent had no formal legal documentation at all. 
Disputes over conflicting claims to the same piece of land 
played an important role in causing the government to develop more 
systematic and elaborate systems of land rights in Thailand. In the 
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Table 5: Major Change in the Thai System of Property Rights 
in Land, 1850-1954 
Period 








Source: Feeny (1982). 
Institutional Change 
Usufruct Rights, existing system 
Issue title deeds based on the area 
harvested 
Issue title deeds based on the area owned 
Prescribe standardized forns and procedur~b 
in an effort to reduce land disputes 
Enact a comprehensive land la~ with 
prbvision for title deeds and use of land 
as collateral 
Institute a Torrens syster.i of land 
registration and conduct cadastral 
surveys 
Amendment to 1901 law allowing for 
ownership based on registration with the 
Land Department of claims on unsurveyed 
lands 
Enact a new land law providing for a 
variety of docunents and levels of 
security of land rights 
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early twentieth century period differential access to the fonnal syster, 
and the ability of powerful government officials to manipulate the :and 
records system allowed elites to obtain ownership to land which unde~ 
t.he traditional system would have been controlled by hanesteadir:;~ 
cultivators. Today intro-familial manipulation of the system has al-
lowed some heirs to gain at the expense of others. 9 The traditional 
system of equal inheritance by all surviving children is frequently 
subverted by more literate and knowledgeable siblings, resulting in a 
clash between the use of the "modern" system and traditional inheritance 
practices. The central government has been increasingly involved in tlie 
adjudication of local disputes which in fonner times would have been 
settled by local officials. 
In the Thai case the appreciation of land prices led to an 
increase in the demand for a more systematic set of procedures for 
defining property rights in land. The government in fact responded to 
the der.1ands and gradually a new system of property rights evolved. \Jha t 
factors contributed to the willingness and capability of the governnent 
to supply the institutional change? 
In part the new system evolved as a practical solution to the 
land disputes that became so canmon as land became more valuable. The 
cost of supplying a new set of institutions was lowered by the 
availability of European systems and officials - by the existence of a 
stock of knowledge and practice on the organization of property rights 
in land. Over time that system was increasingly indigenized. While it 
has never been vigorously exploited in Thailand, a better cadastral 
system also gave the government an enhanced land tax revenue base. 
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Finally, private and social interests coincided. Members of the elite, 
gove:::Tlr.lent officials, participated in the land boan and benefited frun 
the more secure system of property rights in land. They had an 
incentive to supply the new system because they too would share in t.l1e 
gains. By separating land ownership from land use, members of the elite 
could become non-cultivating landowners with secure title and thus 
capture the capital gains. Under the traditional usufruct system this 
was not possible. 
During the 1850 to 1912 period the Thai government made 
another fundamental change in its property rights systems. It gradually 
disnantled a system of property rights in man (corvee and debt slavery). 
The chanie was facilitated by a significant decline in real wabes over 
. d 10t he per1.o. The development of more efficient wage-labor markets and 
immigration of Chinese workers made corvee a less attractive fom of 
taxation. With the general rise in commercialization, money taxes could 
be substituted for taxes in kind and in labor services. The rise of 
property rights in land created a new asset for use as collateral. The 
motivations of the monarch in abolishing slavery included humanitarian 
goals and the desire to be seen as progressive in an international 
seting in which slavery was increasingly condemned. Domestic political 
factors were important as well. By gradually abolishing slavery and 
corvee, the king could remove the control of labor services fror. 
powerful opposition noble families and thus consolidate his position 
with respect to the nobles. Thus both economic (decline in real wages, 
rise in factor and product markets) and political factors (both danestic 
and international) underwrote a sweeping transformation of the Thai 
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property rights system fran one of property rights in man to one of 
property rights in land. 
Burma 
The property rights systems in land and man in pre-colonial 
Bunna were not unlike the systems in Thailand. 
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There were systens of 
property rights in man in the fonns of corvee and debt slavery. 
Traditional property rights in land were largely usufruct rights, rights 
were retained only through use, although technically land had to have 
been abandoned for 12 years before it was available for the use of 
others. Land could often be sold, mortgaged, or inherited, although in 
some districts land could only be sold to someone from the same 
district. There was a significant amount of ·regional variation in the 
property rights system. As in the Thai case all land belonged to the 
king but the populace was allowed to clear land and retain it and obtain 
title documents. An additional category of land was the absolute 
property of the king and was often allocated for crown service or to 
local officials. Vacant lands were available for clearing and usufruct 
rights. Finally, glebe land rights did not depend on continued oc-
cupation. 
The British were perplexed by the system of shiftinE 
cultivation practiced by Burman fanners and were opposed to the frequent 
abandonnent of fields. In fact Furnival reports that the traditional 
usufruct system under which a cultivator could only exclude others from 
using land while it was in fact in use, in interaction with the fallO\-' 
system of shifting cultivation, did sometimes result in insufficient 
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fallow periods. As a result of British opposition to the abandoment of 
fields and in a desire to create a peasant proprietary system, spe::ia: 
hanesteading and fallow tax rates were built into the land rights and 
revenue system. British motivation included the desire to build a land 
tax revenue base to support gover11Ment operations. Policy can also be 
seen as a reaction to previous experience in India in that officials 
wanted to create a class of peasant cultivators. The overriding basis 
of land policy was a belief in the efficiency of private property rights 
and a laissez-faire ideology. 
Ne\.:ly cleared land was initially exempt from land taxes. Low 
tax rates applied to land that was registered as being fallow. On 
unregistered fallow land higher tax rates were charged. After occupying 
land for 12 years and paying the land taxes, title deeds we~e issued and 
land could then be used as collateral. 
The use of the British system of property rights in land 
increased significantly during the rice export boom of the late 
nineteenth century. From the 1870s on fanners decided with increasing 
frequency to pay taxes on fallowed land in order to retain their rights. 
As land was used for collateral, land alienation became increasingly 
frequent over the 1908-30 period and rapidly increased during the 
depression of the 1930s. In the late 1930s and early 1940s, the 
colonial government responded with tenancy legislation, thus restricting 
the property rights in land which they had earlier created. 
In Bunna the ideology of the colonial power interacted with 
the indigenous systems of property rights and fanning to create a new 
system with alienable rights in land but also with provisions for 
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homesteading and fallow periods. The motivations included the creation 
of a society of peasant cultivator-owners who would have the incentive 
to cultivate efficiently. The desire to avoid concentration of 
ownership was somewhat thwarted by the 1930s trend in land alienation. 
As in the Thai case, the increase in land prices did create 
demands for more secure property rights in land and greater utilization 
of that system. Because the provision and operation of that system was 
in the ideological and economic interests of the colonial govennent, 
changes in the property rights system and the administrative system with 
which to operate it were forthcoming. The institutional arrangements 
designed for Burma also reflected compromises that explicitly took into 
account the traditional fallow practices and traditional rights to 
clearing "waste" land. 
India 
Any generalization about the system of property rights in land 
in India and the trends in that system are quite hazardous and will 
probably fail to do justice to the regional, ethnic, and temporal 
diversities found there. With that major caveat in mind, the broad 
12trends will, nonetheless, be examined. 
The traditional system that the British encountered was one of 
inalienable hereditary resident cultivator rights. In Bengal a class of 
revenue collectors known as zamindars acted as intermediaries between 
the cultivators and the rulers. In Oudh the talqudars acted as 
intermediaries above the village level with land revenue collection 
rights. 
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British law and practice varied considerably within India and 
over time. In general, howevt:'r, the British sought. to make land private 
alienable property with individual property rights being assigned to the 
person responsible for paying the land tax. Like Indian govern::ients 
before them, the British East India Company and the colonial governnent 
relied heavily on land tax revenues. The development of property ri~hts 
in land was thus inextricably linked to revenue policy. As the British 
administrative "frontier" moved within India for over 100 yea-::-s, 
experience in "older" areas affected practice in the newly governed 
rebions. Thus Madras experience affected Bombay, Uttar Pradesh 
experience impacted upon the Punjab, and Bengal practice was transferred 
to·Banares. Local conditions also affected the system adopted and in 
particular its actual practice. In addition, the degree to which the 
colonial government thought that it was expedient to co-opt the loyalty 
of the indigenous elite in governing the country often profoundly af­
fected land settlements. Thus the post-Mutiny period witnessed a number 
of policy reversals. 
Finally, an additional important variable in the detennination 
of the land system was the prevailing ideology of the responsible 
British officials in London and in India. The rise and decline of 
utilitarian thought was reflected in British policy in India. 
As a sweeping generalization, two basic paradigms of British 
practice may be distineuished. In the zamindar system land rights were 
•given to the tax collectors as a landed gentry who then became the 
landlords to the cultivators. In the ryotwari systeD, land rights were 
instead invested in the peasant cultivators themselves. 
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The zarninda:- systen was first created by_ LorJ Cornwallis ir. 
Bengal in 1793 and was congruent with his Whig belief in the superiori~y 
of government by a landed gentry who would in turn supervise the 
cultivators to ensure efficient practice. The relatively lo~ 
transaction cost of this strategy made it quite attractive. Rather thi:in 
having to determine the ownership of each piece of land anci keep tracJ: 
of each individual land t.ransaction, large areas could be administered 
by dealing with a single landowner. The political advantages includec 
the enhanced loyalty of the traditional elite. Cornwallis encountered a 
very entrenched class of zamindars in Bengal who bad thwarted earlier 
attenpts at direct settlement with the cultivators. It is easy to 
understand his choice of sett.lements. 
The zanindar system was first used.in Bengal. An important 
component of the Bengal zamindar settlement, the distribution of land 
rights to zamindar revenue collectors as landlords, was copied in parts 
of Madras and in Uttar Pradesh. It was later extended to a nllr:lber of 
areas after the 1857 Mutiny in an effort to restore order and loyalty. 
The ryotwari system was gradually developed in Madras in the 
1790s by Munro and copied in the Bombay Presidency in the 1830s. It 
aros~ in part because there was no existing class of local zamindars. 
Its heavy demands on knowledge of the area and the ability to conduct 
detailed settler:ient surveys were met by the availability of military 
officers like Munro who had extensive experience in Madras and a 
knowledge of the indigenous language. In addition the land revenue 
system in Madras was designed to allow the cultivator to designate (at 
the beginning of the year) the fields for which he would be responsiole 
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for the paynent of land taxes, an attractive feature in a region suhject 
to variable rainfall. 
~hile the Northwest was originally settled through the 
zarnindar syster.1, the ryotwari system was introduced in the 1843-53 
period of utilitarian refonns. After the Mutiny, the zamindar syster,1 
was reinstituted in Oudh and the Punjab. In addition to political 
expendiency, the policy reversal was also the result of a growing dis­
satisfaction on the part of British officials with the imposition of 
alien (British) concepts of property and their growing appreciation and 
knowledee of indigenous institutions and concepts of property. 
The ryotwari system required detailed cadastral surveys and a 
nuch more ccxnplex administrative machinery. Ricardian rent theory 
affected the thinkihg of Mill and many other British officials in the 
early nineteenth century. In the Bombay Presidency the implementation 
of that thinking was especially vigorous. 13 A complex cadastral survey 
was be5un in 1835. It classified land into nine soil quality categories 
and also based its relative land quality rankings on clb1ate, market 
access, distance to village, village population, and likely availability 
of manure. \Jhile the detailed land and t.it.le surveys gave relative rent 
rankings, the governr.ient still needed a way of detennining the absolute 
rent. Officials decided to use trial and error. If taxes were set 
above the level of rent, land abandornnent and declines in cultivation 
would follow. If t.axes were set helm.; the rents, cultivation would 
expand. By examining the revenue history of an area, the absolute level 
of t.axes needed to capture the Ricardian rents for the government could 
be detennined. Technically the land belonged to the government and the 
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cultivators paid taxes as rent on the land. Officials believed that 
efficiency would be enhanced hy assessing renLs that were approxm.ately 
equal to the Ricar.dian rent. 
McAlpin (1984) argues that the agricultural sector in the 
Bombay Presidency (or at least those areas that have been carefully 
. ~studied) perfonned we.J.. ..... Capital accunulated, cultivation increased, 
and land prices rose. Clear titles were issued and tenure was made more 
secure. Taxes were rationalized and lowered in the process. 
of the success was clue to the adherence to Ricardian rent theory and hO\, 
much was due to the favorable agricultural prices experienced is, 
however, difficult to detemine. 
The introduction of secure pioperty rights in land in India 
created new credit markets. Over. the nineteenth century the econor:1y 
experienced the spread of "law and order", a marked reduction in 
transport costs, a rise in cor.unercial agriculture, and a rise in land 
prices. In some areas land taxes were set at high levels and zamindars 
fell into arrears, often losing land to moneylender and commercial 
castes. Land alienation often significantly altered the distribution of 
land holdings that had originally been envisaged by the British. 
Colonial officials also increasingly became concerned over 
tenant rights. Beginning in 1886 a series of laws to grant greater 
security to tenants were passed. Many of these provided for hereditary 
tenant rights after twelve continuous years of occupation. Naturally 
landlords could easily circumvent the restrictions by "rotating" their 
tenants. 
In India we can see that political expediency, utilitarian and 
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\~hip, ideologies, indigenous systems, and the practical considerations of 
transaction cost in creating and adninistering a land rights-revenul' 
system all interacted to produce a number of distinct systems which then 
had their own individual evolutions. Creating alienable land also had a 
quite significant impact on the Indian society as well as the operation 
of its agricultural markets. 
14
Philippines 
In pre-Spanish. times there was traditional communal ownership 
of lan<l and a fairly elaborate system of property rights in man. 
Individuals had usufruct rights in land. There were several categories 
of debt slavery under which slaves owed their owners fixed shares of 
their crop output. 
The Spanish viewed debt slavery as the product of anti-social 
usury and moved to abolish it. They also introduced private individual 
property rights in land and alienability. Title to the fonnerly corn-
munal lands was generally issued to the indigenous chief. In addition, 
sane royal land was donated to religious estates and some was made 
available for homesteading under the provision that unless it was kept 
in use, the title would revert to the crown. Over time the alienability 
of land often resulted in mestizo moneylenders acc1JJT1ulating control of 
land through loan defaults. 
While in the technical sense land was the property of the 
state until the late nineteenth century, in practice private ownership, 
sale, lease, and inheritance prevailed. With the sugar export boom of 
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the nineteenth century and rise in land values which accompanied 
agricultural canmercialization, land disputes became more common. In 
response the colonial government began issuing clear land titles in 
1885. Confusion, however, remained. 
The next major step came with the new colonial government of 
the United States. In response to the confusion in the documentation of 
land rights, a Cadastral Act was passed in 1913 9 followed by a survey 
which took six years to complete. Provisions were made for the 
homesteading of vacant lands and the mechanism was frequently used 
during the sugar export booms. The desire to avoid land taxes did, 
however, lead to a failure to acquire formal title to occupied lands. 
Like the systems in Thailand and Burma, literate elites were often able 
to manipulate the formal system to acquire legal title to lands that had 
been cleared by others, thus contributing to a more unequal distribution 
of land. 
Section IV: Conclusions 
Several inductive conclusions follow from the brief discussion 
of the trends in property rights systems. First, the rising value of 
land induced increased interest in acquiring land and utilizing the 
system of property rights in land. The increased interest in acquiring 
land led to disputes over ownership that often exposed weaknesses in the 
prevailing system of identifying and administering land rights. A 
umber of attempts at administrative solutions typically followed, often 
finally resulting in the institution of a full cadastral survey. 
In this context it is useful to distinguish between the ef-
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fects of rising land values on land already under cultivation and the 
effects of rising land values in inducing an expansion in the area under 
cultivation. In the former case traditional or existing institutions to 
define property rights in land came under less pressure for change. In 
settled communities ownership boundaries tended to be well known and 
thus there was less uncertainty about how land disputes would be 
adjudicated. De facto rights were often enforceable even in the absence 
de jure documents. Under these circumstances the major advantage of 
obtaining formal documentation of land rights was the improved access to 
credit that it afforded. 
On the frontier where settlements were new, boundaries were 
not well known to all and there was great uncertainty about the outcooe 
of land disputes. In a sense the formal procedures and documents of the 
government partly substituted for the local knowledge and enforcement 
mechanisms that existed within the settled communities. Thus on the 
frontier the demand for more precise and secure property rights in land 
tended to be greater. New institutional arrangements were in fact 
frequently provided in response to the demand articulated through land 
disputes. 
Second, differential access to the increasingly formal and 
legalistic system provided an important avenue through which unequal 
patterns of land ownership could emerge. Elites were often very sue-
cessful in manipulating land records in their favor. This appears to 
have happened in Burma, the Philippines, Cochin China, and the Rangsit 
15area in central Thailand. Inequality was also created (although 
frequently eroded through alienation) by the initial distribution of 
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land to elite groups in the Philippines, Bengal, and Northwest India. 
On the other hand, alienation appears to have promoted land 
concentration on Burma. 
Third, in many cases a major motivating factor of the 
goverment in the creation and administration of the land rights system 
was the desire to collect land-tax revenues. The taxpayer was defined 
as the owner, thus often converting an indigenous political intermediary 
of the traditional system into a full owner under the new system. 
Fourth, in virtually all cases the legal provisions "exceeded" 
administrative practice in the degree of sophistication and precision of 
the land rights. This occurred for two reasons. First, the 
transactions cost of establishing and operating the systems were 
considerable and much higher than enacting the enabling legislation. 
Cadastral surveys took years and even decades to complete and as we can 
see from the Thai evidence are often still incomplete. Second, colonial 
powers (and thus the stock of knowledge of institutions from which the 
Thais directly borrowed) came from different economic and institutional 
(as well as ecological) enviroments. Relative land scarcity and 
relatively high land values had often prevailed for centuries. In 
addition higher stocks of human capital made more administratively 
demanding systems of land rights feasible. Naturally there was a 
tendency to introduce something like the "home" system which was often 
overly sophisticated. Often explicit compromises were made (for 
homesteading for instance) in the legislation and additional compromises 
emerged in the implementation of the systems and subsequent revisions in 
the legislation. The 1954 Land Code in Thailand can be seen as an 
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example of such a comprcxnise. 
Finally in all the cases it appears that the rise in the terms 
of trade and growth of population were indeed associated with a rise in 
real land prices. That increase was in turn associated with an increase 
in the demand for more precise land rights and a greater utilization of 
the existing system to increase the security of land rights. A more 
secure system of land rights gradually evolved. Greater securi~y 
typically came in two forms. First, there was reduced uncetainty abou~ 
the outcome of the adjudication of landownership disputes. Seconds 
owners had greater assurance that they would be able to retain long run 
rights in the land. 
The evolution of the system of land rights was affected by 
political exped_iency, ideology and conventional wisdom, transaction 
cost, and the system that immediately preceded it. In short, both the 
supply of and demand for institutional change played an important role 
in the nineteenth and twentieth century development of property rights 
in land in Asia. 
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Section V: Implications for Future Research 
The paper provides an interpretation of the comparative 
development of property rights in land in South and Southeast Asia 
during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The implications of the 
approach have, however, not been fully exploited. It is then useful to 
indicate the future research needed in order to construct a more 
complete interpretation. 
First, the stock of qualitative and in particular quantitative 
evidence on the trends in property rights systems, relative product 
prices, and relative factor prices needs to be augmented. Quantitative 
measures of institutional change need to be created to facilitate crude 
hypothesis testing. Measures of the degree of utilization of the land 
rights system such as the percent of the area under cultivation that is 
titled are an example. 
Second, a nunber of implications of the model need to be 
explored. For instance the demand induced model of institutional change 
is based on the premise that innovations in institutional arrangements 
are made in order to capture gains previously unobtainable. In the case 
of property rights in land those gains include the capital gains 
resulting from the appreciation in land rents, enhanced incentives to 
invest in land productivity-increasing improvements, and improved access 
to credit markets. From the point of view of the state, property rights 
in land provided a lucrative source of tax revenues as well as potential 
political benefits in the fonn of loyalty to the regime. 
Evidence on the magnitude and trends in each of the gains 
should be sought. Greater precision and security of land rights should 
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enhance incentives for land development. Thus it would be important t.o 
examine evidence on rates of investment in land development and 
productivity differentials between areas with more and less secure land 
rights. Of course to the extent that land rights are first provided in 
•ore fertile and commercialized areas, there is a simultaneity problem 
canplicating any inferences that may be drawn. 
Similarly another benefit of more secure land rii:1ts is the 
ability to use land as collateral thus improving access to credit 
markets. Thus one should observe longer debt maturities and/or lower 
real interest rates resulting from land titling. (Once again there is a 
simultaneity problem.) 
Finally, if the appreciation in real land rents followed the 
appreciation of the tems of trade and induced the development of core 
secure property rights in land, what happened when the tenns of trade 
declined and why was a reversal in the property rights developments not. 
observed; Several tentative answers suggest themselves. First, real 
land rents in fact depend on more than the terms of trade and in 
particular the downward pressure on land rents was in part blunted in 
many cases by technical changes which served to increase the 
productivity of land. Similarly irrigation development and falling 
transportation costs helped to offset the downward pressure on land 
rents that occurred when the terms of trade declined. Furthermore~ 
institutional change is not instantaneous. It is subject to lags. Thus 
the periods of declining real land rents may not have been of •ufficient 
duration to have induced major changes in the institutional ar­
rangements. One should, however, still observe declines in the marginal 
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rate of utilization of the "sticky" institutional arrangements. In 
addition, each new institutional arrangement becomes part of the status 
quo with vested interests now often committed to its maintenance. Thus 
the incentives for parties who seek to reverse earlier institutional 
innovations need to be powerful. As a result, one might not expect a 
dismantling of the system of property rights in land during the periods 
of declining terms of trade and real land rents but instead to observe a 
period of quiescence. 
In sun more work is needed in order to fully elaborate and 
test the induced model of institutional change against the nineteenth 
and twentieth century Asian experience. While the use of economic 
history as a laboratory for the testing of theory can be a powerful 
.research tool, especially in the mainly non-experimental disciplines of 
the social sciences, it is also important to briefly apply the analysis 
to the contemporary world. 
Many of the historical transformations described are still 
occurring today. Technical change in the forms of mechanization and of 
modern fertilizer-responsive varieties of rice are powerful forces 
contributing to the evolution of labor market institutions for the 
recruitment and supervision of harvesting labor in Indonesia and the 
Philippines. Hayami and Kikuchi (1981) describe the disequilibrilml in 
traditional harvest labor institutions created by the higher yielding 
varieties. With the introduction of those varieties traditional harvest 
shares for harvest workers substantially exceeded real wages in the 
local economy. Mechanization of harvest operations, the hiring of 
extra-village harvest wage labor teams, or the.innovation of new share-
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harvest arrangements are the three primary responses to the 
disequilibrium, with the choice depending in large part upon the degree 
of village social cohesion. In the process the division of the gains 
from the introduction of the new varieties is being assigned. 
Increasing population density and the spread of transportation 
and communication infrastructure are creating disputes over land 
ownership in many areas in the less developed world today. For instance 
in northern Thailand the spread of cultivation by ethnic Thai lowlanders 
up the slopes of the mountains is coming into conflict with the swidden 
cultivation practices of ethnic minority hill tribesmen. The situation 
is further complicated by the open access nature of the forests in 
Thailand. 16 While in theory forest lands belong to the state with some 
provision for traditional use of forest products for home consumption, 
the state's property rights in increasingly scarce forest land. cannot be 
adequately enforced. Because forest land which is brought under 
cultivation is not supposed to be converted into private property., 
farmers have few incentives to invest in land development and little 
security. When titles or other land registration documents are issued, 
the unequal access to Thai bureaucracy generally means that ethnic Thai 
are favored in the distribution of property rights in land. The general 
insecurity in land rights has meant, according to recent World Bank 
observers, that farmers have continued to use environmentally damaging 
extensive means of cultivation when all parties recognize that it would 
be in the long run interests of the farmers themselves, •• well as the 
people downstream who suffer from increased flooding and siltation, if 
more intensive modes of cultivation were used. Property rights issues 
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lie at the heart of many open access and/or common property resource 
disputes in the Third World today. Innovations in institutional ar-
rangements to ameliorate these market failure problems in the use of 
land, water, forest, and fisheries resources should therefore be a high 
priority on the political economy research agenda. The supply and 
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